This paper provides a structural estimation of an equilibrium search model with on-thejob search and heterogeneity in¯rms' productivities using a sample of Italian workers. Allowing for productivity di®erentials among¯rms, the model is able to¯t the wage distribution satisfactorily. Results indicate that arrival rates of o®ers for workers are higher when unemployed than when employed and¯rms exploit their monopsnony power when setting wages. As a result, workers earn far less than their marginal product. The paper also provides an estimate of the underlying distribution of productivity across¯rms. Geographical strati¯cation reveals also interesting di®erences in transition parameters across workers. y Address:
Introduction
Wage regressions are probably one of the most widely estimated equations in labour economics. The identi¯cation of underlying theoretical parameters and the decomposition of observed wage variation represent two of the main areas of research in the¯eld. However, results from reduced form approaches indicate that at most half of observed dispersion in wages can be "explained" by observable characteristics, and that the rest has to be imputed to measurement error or unobservable components. Search models explain observed variation in wages as resulting from productivity di®erentials and search frictions. The relative contribution of the two components is identi¯ed by structurally estimating the relevant parameters of equilibrium search models.
During recent years, some important theoretical contributions establish that wage dispersion is an equilibrium outcome even if workers and¯rms are homogeneous (Burdett and Mortensen, 1998) . Moreover the obtained equilibrium distribution of wages comes in closed form solution allowing for an empirical estimation of such models. It is no surprise that thesē ndings have been accompanied by a growing empirical literature dealing with the structural estimation of these equilibrium search models (see Van den Berg, 1999) . Behind this research e®ort there are two main reasons. On the one hand, the partial equilibrium search models are not able to fully characterise equilibrium labour market outcomes (Rothschild, 1973) ; on the other hand, new available information on labour market histories of workers and¯rms adds considerable information to our understanding of labour market phenomena. Equilibrium search theory provides also a renewed framework for labour market policy analysis with an active role for¯rms as pro¯t maximisers. This framework is also suitable for comparative statics exercises and test for some policy implications in an equilibrium environment that were not possible in previous search models (e.g., minimum wage). The second important ingredient is the possibility of accessing until now unavailable information on labour market histories of workers and¯rms, and then structurally estimate the relevant parameters deriving from the theory. 1
In an environment characterised by perfect information, the result of a wage posting game among homogeneous¯rms is the Bertrand outcome. The distribution of wages degenerates at the competitive equilibrium level. The introduction of some imperfections in this environment implies that the competitive outcome doesn't hold. The resulting distribution of wages degenerates at the monopsonistic level and the worker doesn't receive any surplus from the match (Diamond, 1971) . Introducing search frictions, simply intended as time required for agents to obtain information, generates match speci¯c rents that are shared between workers and¯rms. The perfectly competitive outcome (workers are paid their marginal product and enjoy all the surplus deriving from the match) and the monopsonistic result (workers do not get any fraction of the surplus and¯rms have complete monopoly power in o®ering wages) constitute the limiting cases in a framework that provides an alternative explanation to the (simple) marginal productivity theory of wages. In such an environment, search frictions give the employers some monopsony power, but this power is limited by competition with other employers over time. Firms can implement some wage policies, in the sense that they face a trade-o® between posting high wages and attracting workers. With on-the-job-search, higher wages mean less pro¯t per worker but more workers and less probability of quitting behaviour of "insiders";¯rms¯ll vacancies more quickly and equalise pro¯ts with respect to low wage¯rms enjoying a greater labour force.
The possibility of a wage distribution as an equilibrium outcome comes in an elegant 1 It is important to remember that although equilibrium search models can be estimated from workers' data only, the recent availability of so-called matched employer-employee data sets adds considerable amount of information to our previous knowledge. Firm data can be particularly useful for structural estimations of equilibrium search models.
closed form solution (Burdett and Mortensen, 1998; Mortensen, 1990) . 2 However, the model in its basic form has the implication that both densities for the distribution of wages o®ered and the distribution of wages actually paid to employees (earnings distribution), are increasing and left skewed with the wages concentrated near the competitive equilibrium.
This characteristic is clearly at odds with the form of the earnings distribution that we observe in reality that has a (log)normal shape with a very long right tail. As a consequence, the empirical implementation of equilibrium search models has mostly focused on¯tting the right tail of the wage distribution.
The¯rst attempts to structurally estimate the relevant parameters of the pure homogeneous Burdett and Mortensen (1998) model give unsatisfactory results, given they are not able to¯t the wage distribution (see Van den Berg and Ridder, 1993a, 1993b; and Kiefer and Neumann,1993) . 3 To¯t the right tail of the distribution, it is essential to introduce some kind of heterogeneity across worker/¯rms' productivities or measurement error. Heterogeneity can be modelled along various dimensions. 4 Allowing productivity levels to vary across di®erent segments of the labour market, as de¯ned by occupation, education or age categories permits a reasonable¯t to the data. Van den Berg and Ridder (1998) and Van den Berg (1997) allow for this kind of between-markets observable heterogeneity.
On the other hand, Bowlus et al. (1995 Bowlus et al. ( , 2001 , and Bontemps et al. (1999 Bontemps et al. ( , 2000 estimate equilibrium search models assuming¯rms di®er in their productivity level within the same market. The former approach allows for a discrete distribution of productivity types, whereas the latter¯ts the data assuming a continuous distribution of productivities. 5
This paper provides a structural estimation of the relevant parameters of the equilibrium search model allowing for a continuous distribution of productivity across¯rms. 6 First, I
provide a non-parametric estimation of the distribution of earned wages; then I structurally estimate the frictional parameters of the equilibrium model using maximum likelihood techniques. Finally, conditional on previous steps, I can recover an estimate of the distribution of productivities across¯rms in the market and a measure of their monopsony power exerted when posting wages. The estimation method proves particularly e®ective to study the dynamics of wage mobility in a structural approach. To the best of my knowledge, this paper represents the¯rst attempt of studying those dynamics in such a framework using Italian data. Given this, I compare my results with those found by Bontemps et al. (2000) for
The main¯ndings of the paper can be identi¯ed as follows. The arrival rate of employment of opportunities when unemployed is ten times higher than the one when employed. The low level of search while on-the-job negatively a®ects the speed at which workers climb the job ladder: Italian workers receive on average 0.5 acceptable o®ers per month. The estimated distribution of productivities in the economy indicates that this distribution is much more dispersed and polarised at very low and high levels than the corresponding wage distribution.
Moreover, the mapping from productivity to wages indicates that high productivity¯rms o®er proportionally higher wages. In general,¯rms are well able to exploit their monopsony power and appropriate most of the rents from the match. Strati¯cation by observable worker characteristics also indicates interesting di®erences among groups. Finally, some interesting 5 Bowlus et al. (2001) examine advantages and disadvantages of the two approaches.
6 The estimation methodology is the "three" step method as proposed by Bontemps et al. (2000) .
7 Launov (2003) analyses labour market dynamics in an equilibrium search environment using Austrian data. patterns in regional productivity di®erentials are recognised.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows: in section two I present the theoretical equilibrium search model with productivity dispersion across¯rms. Then, in section three I describe the data and the selection of the sample. The estimation method and results are also provided. In the last section, I conclude and discuss some further research issues.
The Equilibrium Search Model
Here I provide a complete description of the Burdett and Mortensen (1998) equilibrium search model. The model is also extended along the lines proposed by Bontemps et al. (2000) . In the original version with homogeneous workers and¯rms, the economy is composed by a large number of¯rms whose measure is normalised to 1; m is the large number of workers in the economy. It is assumed that the worker can be in one of the two states, employed or unemployed, and u is the number of unemployed. Workers are assumed to search both when employed and unemployed. In both cases the probability of receiving an o®er is distributed according to a standard Poisson process where¸0 is the arrival rate of job o®ers while unemployed and¸1 when employed. R is the reservation wage when unemployed, while the wage earned w is the reservation wage when employed. When unemployed a worker has utility°o w given by b, this is assumed equal among workers and can be interpreted as the value of leisure or the level of unemployment bene¯t per period. When employed, workers earn their wage w and p is the°ow revenue generated per employed worker, a¯rm earns p ¡ w when the job is¯lled. There is no endogenous job destruction deriving from productivity shocks, but ± is the exogenous probability that a job is destroyed at every moment in time. De¯ne k 0 =¸0=± and k 1 =¸1=±. F (w) is the distribution of wages o®ered to workers and G(w)
is the distribution of wages actually paid to employed workers. The latter is the earnings distribution. First analyse the behaviour of workers. They adopt a strategy of search that has the reservation wage property, the latter (with zero discounting) is given by
The reservation wage of unemployed workers is given by the value of leisure plus the expected gain from search while employed. For unemployed workers, it is optimal to accept any wage above the reservation wage. Given the di®erence k 0 ¡ k 1 , the expected gains from search are determined by the probability of getting an o®er higher than the actual wage, discounted by the probability that the job is terminated (both for exogenous destruction or because of a better opportunity). Employed workers adopt a reservation strategy as well and will accept any wage strictly greater than w.
The equation of motion of unemployment in this economy is given by the di®erence between the°ow in and the°ow out of the stock. In steady state
Since F (R) is equal to zero because no worker will accept a wage below the reservation wage, further manipulations give the equilibrium unemployment rate
This expression is increasing in ± and decreasing in¸0.
Let G(w)(m ¡ u) be the number of employed receiving a wage no greater than w; the evolution of this stock over time is given by
where the¯rst part of the right hand side refers to the°ow of workers that are unemployed and receive an acceptable o®er above their reservation wage (and below w), and the second is the sum of workers previously holding a job that has been destroyed and those who¯nd a better opportunity and quit the old job. The°ows in and out of this group should be equal in a steady state, so that the distribution of wages currently paid reads as
The fraction of workers receiving a wage less or equal to w is given by the fraction of¯rms o®ering that particular wage (or less), divided by the probability that the job is either destroyed or the worker quits. Equation (3) represents the structural relationship between the distribution of wages actually paid to employed workers and the distribution of wages o®ered, as imposed by the steady state condition.
Let l(wjR; F ) be the measure of workers per¯rm earning a wage w given R and F: That speci¯es the steady state number of workers available to a¯rm o®ering a particular wage conditional on the wage o®ered by other¯rms, represented by F; and the workers' reservation wage R. This measure can be written as
where g(w) and f(w) are the densities of the corresponding distributions. This expression is increasing in w and continuous on the support of the distribution F . In what follows it is also useful to recall again the structural relationships between the earnings and o®er distribution. This is given by the following expression
Using 5, substitute again in the expression for l(w): 8 The latter can be rewritten as
8 The expression 1 ¡ F (w) for the o®er distribution is given by
This is the number of workers available to work at the¯rm o®ering that particular wage w. 9
Let's now look at the¯rm's productivity. First the case with homogeneous¯rms is analysed, the model is then extended to allow for heterogeneity in¯rms' productivities.
Homogeneous Firms. Firms post wages to maximise their steady state pro¯t°ow,
given R and F . p is the common°ow revenue generated by an employed worker, with b < p < 1. When a worker and a¯rm meet they do not bargain over the wage but divide the surplus deriving form their match getting w ¡ b and p ¡ w respectively. Notice that the wage has been previously¯xed by the¯rm to maximise the steady state°ow of pro¯ts.
Firms solve the following problem
An equilibrium is de¯ned as follows De¯nition 2 (Burdett and Mortensen, 1998) An equilibrium solution to the search and wage posting game is a triple fR; F; ¼g such that R satis¯es the reservation wage equation, ¼ satis¯es the¯rm maximisation problem and F is such that: Burdett and Mortensen (1998) demonstrate that the equilibrium solution exists, is unique and the wage o®er distribution is continuous and not degenerate with support [R; w]. 10 Any employer o®ering a wage less than R in equilibrium would have no employee indeed. On the other hand any employer o®ering a wage w¸R will have a positive workforce and pro¯ts.
Heterogeneous Firms. Assume now that¯rms are heterogeneous with respect to their labour productivity parameter p: Let ¡(p) denote the (continuous) distribution of productivity with support [p; p]: Under this assumption, the optimal strategy for the¯rm is to 9 Again, the relationship can be expressed as
post a wage in the set of pro¯t maximising wages. Let the function w = K(p) denotes the mapping from the support of the productivity distribution to the support of the wage o®er distribution. 11 Notice that given continuity of this function, the mapping from productivity to o®ered wages determines a continuous distribution for F (w). Firms maximise (7) with respect to w. From the¯rst order condition it is then possible to determine the¯rm value of the productivity parameter
Bontemps et al. (2000) also derive a closed form solution for the density of the productivity of¯rms that are active in the market equilibrium. This can be written as°(
Finally, the wage o®er w = K(p) of a¯rm with productivity p is equal to
This is the central equation of the model (Bontemps et al., 2000) . In this economy an equilibrium is de¯ned as follows De¯nition 3 (Bontemps et al., 2000) A market equilibrium is a triple (R; F (w); K p ) such that 1. The distribution of wage o®ers in the economy is
where ¡(p) is the distribution of¯rms active in the market.
2. R is the worker's best strategy to¯rms' behaviour and satis¯es
3. K p = arg max w f¼(p; w)jR · w · pg is a set of pro¯t maximising wages of type p¯rms with ¼(p; w) de¯ned in (7) and K p de¯ned in (10).
For the homogeneous case, Burdett and Mortensen (1998) show that as long as w = R and¸1 > 0; then the unique candidate for F for any p is
Notice that in the standard basic Burdett and Mortensen (1998) This completes the description of the theoretical models, in the next section I discuss the empirical implementation of the model and present the estimation strategy.
Empirical Analysis
The closed form solution obtained by Burdett and Mortensen (1998) for the equilibrium distribution of wages allows an empirical estimation of the model using data on both workers and¯rms. Nonetheless, the model in its basic form has the implication that densities for both the distribution of wage o®ers F and that of the wages paid G are increasing and left skewed with the wages concentrated near the competitive equilibrium p. This characteristic is clearly at odds with the form of the distribution that we observe in reality that has a (log)normal shape with a very long right tail.
In the case of perfect homogeneity among workers and¯rms, the relevant parameters to be estimated are: b; the workers' common value of non market time; p; the¯rms' common value of productivity; the two ratios k 0 and k 1 (or¸0 and¸1 alternatively); and the job separation (or destruction) rate ±. If b is unobserved then, R is the¯fth parameter. 12 To get a satisfactory¯t of the wage distribution is necessary to introduce some heterogeneity among¯rms. When¯rms are assumed to di®er with respect to their productivity parameter, it is also possible to get an estimate of this distribution using estimated transition parameters and information from the distribution of wages paid to workers actually employed. Before discussing the estimation method, in the next subsection, I brie°y present the data.
Data
In this study, I use a matched employer-employee data base from Italian Administrative
Archives representative of the population of employed workers in the private non-farm sector.
The source of information is the National Social Security Institute (INPS). 13 Data from IsfolInps data base contain all the relevant information I need to estimate an equilibrium search model. 14 The main di±culty with this data set is related to the de¯nition of the status of a worker and his/her classi¯cation. While the position while employed is illuminating about the actual position in the labour market, on the other hand, if the worker exits the market, it is impossible to know if the subsequent period of absence from the records is due to unemployment, work in the public sector, self-employment or retirement. This relevant problem is also related to the impossibility of knowing exactly if the worker has been laid o® or the end of the job has been determined by a voluntary separation. 15
To estimate the relevant parameters of the equilibrium search model I use a sub-sample 
The Likelihood Function and Estimation Method
In what follows I sketch out the procedure used to estimate the model as proposed by 16 Following Contini (2002) , yearly wages are de°ated with the CPI at 1996 prices. Then, to make them comparable across workers with di®erent number of days worked during the year, the following adjustment is adopted: realwage=(yearly wage/days paid)*26 where 26 is the average number of days worked during the month.
job to unemployment and direct job-to-job transition. 17
The likelihood is obtained by multiplication of the individual contributions. Below, the derivation of the likelihood of each observation is provided.
Unemployed Workers. The probability of drawing an unemployed worker is u=m = 1=(1+k 0 ). The distribution of elapsed and residual unemployment durations is assumed to be exponential. The exit rate from unemployment is¸0, and the likelihood iş
Employed Workers. The probability of sampling an employed individual is 1 ¡ u=m = k 0 =(1 + k 0 ). The job duration, given w 1 ; is exponentially distributed with parameter ±, while the employment relationship has exponential duration with parameter ± + 1 F (w 1 ). 18 The likelihood reads as
where v is equal to one if the employment relationship terminates into unemployment.
The model is fully characterised by the¯ve unknowns parameters ¡;¸0;¸1; ±, and R. The frictional parameters are identi¯ed from the duration data, the productivity distribution is identi¯ed from the empirical distribution of wages observed and R is identi¯ed as the lowest wage observed in the sample. 19
The nonparametric estimation procedure can be outlined as follows.
17 Following Contini (2002) and Postel-Vinay and Robin (2002) I arbitrarily de¯ne as job-to-job transitions those moves with an intervening period of unemployment less or equal to one month.
18 Where F (w1) = 1 ¡ F (w):
19 See Kiefer and Neumann (1993).
1. First I estimate G(w) and g(w) using a nonparametric procedure. I use a standard Gaussian kernel estimator for the density and the empirical cumulative distribution for G(w). Let b G and b g denote such estimates. Conditional on k 1 , consistent estimates of
and
2. Replace F and f in the likelihood function by the preceding expressions, and maximize the likelihood with respect to k 0 , k 1 , and ±.
3. Estimate p = K ¡1 (w) and°(p) using the equations below
where p represents a¯rm-speci¯c constant value of productivity,°(p) denotes the density of the productivity distribution and g 0 (w) is obtained by di®erentiation of the earnings density.
It is important to recognise that the procedure can be decomposed in two separate parts.
The¯rst two steps basically analyse only worker behaviour and do not look at the¯rms, while the third exploits information recovered from previous steps to get the distribution of productivity. The latter is obtained without assuming any parametric form.
Results
It is a well known fact that standard wage regression are able to explain at most 50% of wage variation across individuals. The remaining variation in wages is imputed to standard .0006
Figure 1: Kernel Density Estimates of Earnings and O®er Wages measurement error and other unobservable factors. Equilibrium search models try to decompose wage variation in two main components, variation due to di®erences in productivity across¯rms and variation due to search frictions. Moreover, equilibrium search models make speci¯c predictions about the shape of earnings and accepted wages. In the theoretical section this relationship has been characterised in a steady state equilibrium. In general, the expected empirical relationship is that of¯rst order stochastic dominance of the earnings distribution on the wage o®er. In Figure 1 this prediction is explicitly tested using standard kernel estimations of the two densities. The earnings distribution is shifted to the right, indicating that higher wages are more likely to be earned for those employed in February 1991. The distribution of accepted wages after unemployment is instead more concentrated at lower wages.
In Table 2 estimation results for transition parameters are presented. The¯rst interesting result is that of an arrival rate of acceptable wage o®ers when employed much lower than the one when unemployed;¸1's estimate for the all sample is almost ten times larger than¸0:
According to these results, the estimated average duration of unemployment is equal to 23 months. On the other hand, the average duration of an employment relationship terminated by the worker with a quit is equal to 156 months. This indicates that on-the-job search activity is very low and that job search reveals much more pro¯table when unemployed. On the other hand, the job destruction rate is estimated close to 0.012, with an average duration of the job of 83 months. Finally, k 1 =¸1=± gives a measure of the speed at which workers climb the wage ladder. It can be also interpreted as the average number of o®ers received in the time interval. Assuming an equal opportunity of receiving better o®ers during the year, the average number of o®ers if equal to six for a random worker in this sample.
As predicted by the theory, transition parameters provide a measure of the importance of search frictions in the labour market. However, workers di®er according to some observable and unobservable characteristics that a®ect their labour market outcomes. Strati¯cation of the sample according to worker characteristics gives some indication of the di®erence in the degree of search frictions that workers face when looking for a job. Results in Table 2 indicate interesting di®erences among di®erent occupations and age groups. As expected managers rank very high in the probability of getting outside o®ers, their estimated arrival rate of o®ers is equal to 0.06 per month with an average number of o®ers per month greater than ve. On the other hand, job destruction rates are almost constant across di®erent groups with a somewhat higher rate for blue collars. Strati¯cation by di®erent age groups provides expected results with higher job destruction rate for young workers and higher probability of moves for them. Results in the last column of the Table also con¯rm well known¯ndings about the concave relationship between wage and experience in the labour market, with an increasing pro¯le in early stages of the career and with a°attening in late stages.
Transition parameters illustrate interesting results about the degree of search frictions in the labour market and fully characterise the distribution of wages in equilibrium search models. However, as previously discussed, the model in its pure form is not able to¯t the wage distribution and some form of heterogeneity if¯rms' productivities is necessary to get satisfactory results. The estimation method allows also to recover an estimate of the productivity parameter for each¯rm and consequently look at the characteristics of the productivity distribution in the economy. In Figure 2 the estimated productivity distribution is reported using a standard kernel method. 20 The graph indicates that most of the¯rms are concentrated in the lower and higher percentiles of the distribution and that the density in the very long tail of the distribution tends to zero, as predicted by the model and as found when approximating the distribution by some parametric family (e.g., the Pareto family is often used). It should be noted here that the productivity distribution is much more dispersed and concentrated at extreme values than the wage distributions. I will return to these issues in more detail when discussing the strati¯cation by regional area of work of¯rms. wages. This condition can be theoretically identi¯ed as one of very low mobility and almost no search while on-the-job. The index gives also a measure of the proportion of the rents that accrue to workers when starting an employment relationship, or how far are workers from being paid their marginal product p: Figure 4 indicates that¯rms are able to extract almost all the surplus from their workers. The relationship is concave with an asymptotic tendency toward one for high productivity¯rms. This results can be easily interpreted in the theoretical framework proposed in this paper. Given very low level of on-the-job search and a few opportunities to move to better-paying wages,¯rms are able to extract all the surplus log wage log productivity 9 10 11 12 13 7.5 8 8.5
Figure 3: Mapping from Productivity to Wages, Percentiles -Log Scale from their workers paying them wages just above their value of leisure. However, the pattern is somewhat di®erent for low productivity and high productivity¯rms. The mapping from productivity to wages in Figure 3 indicates that high productivity¯rms o®er proportionally higher wages compared to those paid by¯rms in the lower part of the distribution. Higher productivity and higher o®ered wages have opposite e®ect on the monopsony index; in this case it seems that, at least for high productivity¯rms, paying higher wages doesn't harm their capacity of getting most of the rents deriving from the match.
Previous results indicate that the degree of search frictions in Italian labour market is considerable. Workers face di±culties in climbing the job ladder and¯rms are able to exploit the monopsnony power that accrues to them because of the presence of information problem in the market. However, estimates of transition parameters indicate that segmentation of the labour market by observable characteristics of workers can help us to identify those groups that are more severely damaged in this context. Results found for di®erent age groups and for di®erent occupation categories con¯rm previous expectations. However, monopsony power of¯rms and low mobility can also be ampli¯ed by a low level of geographical mobility separately looking at four macro-regions. This exercise could also prove useful when looking at productivity di®erentials in regional contexts. 21 Figure 6 in the Appendix provides kernel estimates of earnings and o®ered wages for di®erent areas. The striking result is that the predicted stochastic dominance relationship between the earnings and o®er distribution is not con¯rmed for the South: accepted and earning wages seem to collapse to the same distribution. A visual inspection indicates that it is the distribution of accepted wages after unemployment that collapses towards the earnings distribution. This could indicate that workers in the South are more likely to get higher wages upon exiting unemployment. 22 Table 3 provides estimation results for arrival rates across di®erent regions. As expected, results show some variability. Estimated parameters After estimating separately for each macro-region the density of earning wages and the transition parameters, in Table 4 some properties of the estimated productivity distribution are reported. 23 Estimated values for productivity are very high given the low value of the frictional parameters. It seems not particularly worth looking at absolute values, while it is more interesting to look at some qualitative results. Some di®erences in the distribution of the productivity across¯rms for di®erent areas emerge when looking at standard descriptive indicators for the distribution. First, the ratio between the 90th and 10th percentile indicates that productivity dispersion is higher in the North-east of Italy. Although the distribution is clearly right skewed, the degree of asymmetry is lower with respect to the one found for other parts of the Country. On the contrary, in the South the distribution of productivity is characterised by a strong concentration of¯rms in the lower deciles with a very high peak 23 See also Figure 6 in the Appendix for a visual inspection of these issues. in the productivity distribution. 24 The mapping from productivity to wages and the value of the monopsony power index do not indicate interesting di®erences across di®erent areas (Figures 7-8 ).
Concluding Remarks
This paper provides an extensive empirical analysis of an equilibrium search model with heterogeneity in¯rms' productivities. The model is able to exploit the double source of wage variation as advocated by equilibrium search models: on-the-job search and productivity di®erentials across¯rms. The latter is necessary to get a good¯t of the wage distribution.
In particular, an exogenous continuous distribution of¯rms' productivity is assumed to exist.
The model is structurally estimated using a "three steps" procedure as recently proposed by Bontemps et al. (2000) . First, the earnings distribution is estimated non-parametrically; then these estimates are used to recover frictional parameters using maximum likelihood methods. Conditional on the previous steps, in the third stage, an estimate of the productivity distribution is provided.
Results indicate that search frictions are important in the process of determination of wages and that Italian¯rms are able to extract from their workers most of the rents upon formation of a match. Wages are increasing (and convex) function of productivity levels. High 24 Average productivity in the South is estimated to be higher than in other parts of the Country. Higher capital/labour ratios can constitute an explanation for this fact. However the model doesn't have capital and the interpretation of this result is left for future research.
productivity¯rms are able to o®er higher wages but still enjoy most of the match-speci¯c rents. This result calls for interesting extensions of the model along the lines proposed by Acemoglu and Shimer (2000) . Introducing (endogenous) capital as production factor can further help in explaining the source of wage dispersion before drawing policy conclusion from this analysis. This paper contributes to the new emerging literature dealing with the structural estimation of equilibrium search models. To the best of my knowledge, it represents the¯rst attempt to analyse the Italian labour market in such a framework. As a consequence, my results can be only compared to those obtained for other countries. In particular, the results presented in this study carry some resemblance with those obtained by Bontemps et al. (2000) for France. In both countries¯rms are well able to exploit their monopsony power when the degree of estimated upward wage/labour mobility is very low. As a consequence high productivity¯rms can o®er high wages and still make big pro¯ts. Strati¯cation by sector of activity as proposed by Bontemps et al. (2000) can prove useful to distinguish more clearly those¯rms. Providing further evidence on these issues is my future research agenda. 3386 (1440) 2941 (891) 4227 (1726) 8749 (2059) 2468 (762) 3372 (1341) 3992 (1723) 3547 (1518) 3311 (1389) 3423 (1503) 3212 (1302) Durations are expressed in months. Monetary values are in 000s of Italian Lira.
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